Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law by Lazarus, Richard J.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2005 
Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of 
Environmental Law 
Richard J. Lazarus 
Georgetown University Law Center, lazarusr@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/163 
 
24 VA. Envtl. L.J. 231-261 (2005) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2010 
 
 
 
Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the 
Nature of Environmental Law 
 
 
 
24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 231-261 (2005) 
 
 
Richard J. Lazarus  
Professor of Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
lazarusr@law.georgetown.edu 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/163/ 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=847685 
 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 231 2005-2006
ESSAY 
HUMAN NATURE, THE LAWS OF NATURE, AND THE 
NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Richard J. Lazarus* 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................ 231 
II. HUMAN NATURE AND THE LAWS OF NATURE ........ 234 
III. THE NATURE OF THE NATION's LAWMAKING 
INSTITUTIONS ........................................ " 240 
A. Structure of Lawmaking Institutions . ............ " 241 
B. Constitutional Limitations on Governmental 
Lawmaking . ..................................... " 243 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT ...... 248 
V. CONCLUSION ......................................... " 259 
The panel's approach in this case leads to the result that regu-
lating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, 
lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating "Com-
merce . .. among the several States." U.S. Constitution, art. I, 
§ 8, cz. 3. 
Rancho Viejo v. Norton, (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)] 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judge, now Chief Justice, John G. Roberts, Jr., does seem to 
have a point, even if "for reasons of [his] own," he makes it 
obliquely. It is, at the very least, not immediately obvious to those 
not steeped in constitutional law, let alone Supreme Court Com-
merce Clause precedent, that persons engaging in the "taking" of 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This article is based on a talk 
presented at a conference entitled "Environmental Letters, Environmental Law" held at 
the University of Virginia on October 6-7, 2005. I would like to thank Professor Jonathan 
Cannon for inviting me to speak at that conference and also to Professors Holly Doremus 
and Peter Brooks for providing commentary on my presentation. I would also like to 
thank Abby DeShazo and Kelly Falls, both Georgetown University Law Center Class of 
2007, for their excellent research assistance. 
1 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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toads are necessarily engaging in "commerce" let alone "Com-
merce ... among the several States" within the meaning of the 
federal Constitution's Commerce Clause.2 
Of all of his judicial writings, moreover, hardly any appear to 
have stirred as much controversy during his recent Senate confir-
mation process as this single sentence included in a dissent from a 
denial of rehearing en bane. Four senators questioned him at 
length about his reference to the "hapless toad," and several of the 
witnesses at the hearings offered their competing interpretations of 
the opinion's significance.3 Many commentators, including some 
environmentalists, sharply condemned then-Judge Roberts. They 
predicted that these words portended his inclination to strike down 
not only the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA)4 as unconsti-
tutional, which was the legal issue raised in the Rancho Viejo v. 
Norton case, but much federal civil rights law and modern welfare 
legislation as welP Other environmentalists, however, disputed 
such a characterization of his words, finding instead reasons for 
possible cautious optimism.6 At the Senate hearing itself, Judge 
Roberts stressed that the dissent's discussion of the "hapless toad" 
was included in an opinion that did no more than dissent from 
denial of rehearing en bane in a case raising the constitutionality of 
the ESA and never purported to address the merits of that consti-
tutional claim.? The dissent concluded only that the full court 
should decide the legal issue, rather than just a three-judge panets 
Chief Justice Roberts also pointed out that he did not join a sepa-
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c1. 3. 
3 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 226, 264, 405, 511, 
515, 530 (2005) (hereinafter cited as "Roberts Senate Confirmation Hearings"). 
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
5 ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN G. ROBERTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 2-3 (2005) ("In the same vein, in his very first opinion 
on the bench, Judge Roberts dissented to express an exceedingly restrictive view of Con-
gress' authority to enact important regulatory legislation. He suggested that Congress did 
not have power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause to protect what he called a 
"hapless toad" through endangered species law. . . . Judge Roberts' apparent view of 
Congress' authority potentially threatens a wide swath of legislation rooted in the Com-
merce Clause, including civil rights safeguards, minimum wage and maximum hour laws, 
clean air, clean water, and workplace safety protections.") Environmental public interest 
groups that belong to the Alliance of Justice include the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., and EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund, Inc. See http://www.afj.org/membership/ 
membership_organizations/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
6 Douglas T. Kendall, What Makes Roberts Different, WASH. POST, July 24, 2005, at B7. 
7 Roberts Senate Confirmation Hearings, supra note 3, at 226, 264, 405. 
8 Rancho Viejo V. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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rate dissenting opinion that addressed the merits and contended 
that the ESA was unconstitutiona1.9 
The purpose of this essay is not to address the merits of the con-
troversy concerning what constitutes the fairest reading of Chief 
Justice Roberts's words as an appellate judge. Nor is it to address 
the underlying legal issue itself concerning the constitutionality of 
the ESA as a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause 
authority. This essay is differently directed. It addresses a broader 
issue about environmental law well highlighted by the toad contro-
versy: why is it that environmental law is so frequently mired by 
legal disputes wherein the legal issues being debated seem so far 
afield from what is truly. important? 
Why does the constitutionality of the ESA turn on the notion 
that preventing species' extinction is regulation of commerce? Yet, 
that is the common ground of all the judges and opposing advo-
cates in Rancho Viejo and the several other federal courts of 
appeals cases addressing the ESA's constitutionality.Io Why does 
the ability of an environmentalist to bring a lawsuit to prevent the 
extinction of a species in another part of the world turn, as the 
Supreme Court held in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in 1992,11 on 
whether the citizen-plaintiff environmentalist can produce a plane 
ticket showing that she has recently visited the species or has dis-
crete plans to visit the species in the very near future? And why 
does the Clean Water Act strictly regulate the discharge of pollu-
tants into navigable waters to protect their physical, chemical, and 
biological integrity, but fail to regulate withdrawals from those 
same waters notwithstanding their equal potential to destroy the 
waters' essential aquatic character?12 
Environmental law is full of these seemingly nonsensical riddles. 
They share, however, a common answer rooted in the challenges 
presented for environmental law by human nature, the laws of 
nature, and the nature of the nation's lawmaking institutions. This 
essay explores the role that all three play in environmental law and 
how the interrelated difficulties presented by each are reflected in 
9 Roberts Senate Confirmation Hearings, supra note 3, at 226, 405; see Norton, 334 F.3d 
at 1158-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
10 Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Invs. v. 
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640-41 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g en bane denied, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (Jones, Jolly, Smith, DeMoss, Clement, and Pickering, n., dissenting); Gibbs v. 
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'! Home Builders Ass'n v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
11 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). 
12 See 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
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the kinds of legal issues that surround environmental lawmaking. 
The essay also discusses how these same difficulties impede envi-
ronmental lawmaking by obscuring from lawmakers, judges, and 
the general population what is truly important about environmen-
tal law. 
The essay is divided into three parts. Part I considers the ways in 
which the need for environmental law derives from the tendency of 
human nature to cause adverse environmental consequences and 
the ways in which the laws of nature make it more difficult to pre-
vent those consequences absent the imposition of external legal 
rules.13 Part II describes how our nation's lawmaking institutions 
are similarly challenged by the laws of nature.14 This includes a 
discussion of how the kinds of laws necessary to bridge the gap 
between human nature and the laws of nature are systematically 
difficult for our lawmaking institutions to develop in the first 
instance and to maintain over time. Part III takes a closer look at 
one of the nation's most important legal institutions-the United 
States Supreme Court-and briefly discusses both its past short-
comings in environmental lawmaking and its potential in the 
future. I5 This part of the essay includes some analysis of the 
Court's deliberations in specific environmental cases, as revealed 
by the recently disclosed official papers of Justice Harry Blackmun. 
II. HUMAN NATURE AND THE LAWS OF NATURE 
"To enjoy freedom, we have to control ourselves." 
Virginia Wolff 
Some environmental pollution is, of course, unavoidable. Basic 
human life requires the consumption of the surrounding natural 
environment. While the First Law of Thermodynamics provides 
for the conservation of energy (and classical physics for the conser-
vation Of mass),16 the Second Law provides for the inevitable 
increases in entropy that result from human activityP The term 
"entropy" refers to the degree of disorder in a system. For 
instance, as energy is transformed from one form to another, some 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 16-4l. 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 42-72. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 73-127. 
16 2 RAYMOND A. SERWAY & JOHN W. JEWEIT, JR., PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICS 582-83 (3d 
ed.2002). 
17 [d. at 643. 
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energy is lost as heat; as the energy decreases, the disorder in the 
system, and hence the entropy, increases. IS 
Natural resource destruction and environmental contamination 
is a form of entropy. Disorder in the ecosystem is increased when 
common resources such as air and water are polluted. Disorder is 
likewise increased whenever complex natural resources are broken 
down into smaller parts. 
In consuming natural resources to provide the basic necessities 
of energy, food, shelter, and clothing, humankind necessarily 
increases entropy in parts of the ecosystem in the form of polluted 
global resources and destroyed natural resources. Fundamental 
human biological processes compel it. Human life depends, as life 
does in many animals, on a series of chemical reactions within the 
cells of the human body capable of breaking down complex chemi-
cal compounds such as glucose into its component parts of carbon 
dioxide and water.19 The technical name of the necessary biochem-
ical process for the breakdown of glucose is carbohydrate catabol-
ism, which itself consists of three major stages: glycosis, citric acid 
cycle (known as the "Krebs cycle") and phosphorylation.20 For the 
purposes of this essay, however, what is important for the non-
scientific reader to understand is how these many biochemical 
processes ultimately depend on the breaking down of more com-
plex and ordered chemical compounds into less complex and more 
disordered chemical elements. Some natural resource destruction 
and environmental pollution are necessarily implicated by such 
processes. As energy is transformed from one form to another, 
natural resources are consumed and contamination of existing nat-
ural resources results. 
To the extent, moreover, that it is human nature to seek to sur-
vive, it is human nature to undertake activities that cause such nat-
ural resource destruction and environmental pollution. That 
central threshold proposition should be noncontroversial. What is 
no doubt more controversial is whether it is similarly human nature 
to consume the natural environment in a nonsustainable fashion. 
Garrett Hardin's classic article "The Tragedy of the Commons," 
published in Science in 1968,21 offers a disturbing answer to that 
18 Id. at 638-43. 
19 3 PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOPHYSICS: DIGESTION, METABOLISM, ENDOCRINE FUNCTION 
AND REPRODUCTION 90-91 (Theodore C. Ruch & Harr D. Patton eds., 20th ed. 1973). 
20 LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 349-426 (3d ed. 1988). 
21 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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question. Although Hardin's central thesis is well-known, it is 
worth emphasis here by repetition: 
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a 
pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman 
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. 
Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for 
centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep 
the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying 
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of 
reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of 
social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent 
logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his 
gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he 
asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal 
to my herd?" . .. [T]he rational herdsman concludes that 
the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another. .. But this is the conclu-
sion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into 
a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best inter-
est in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.22 
Hardin describes his thesis in the limited context of human 
nature faced with a pasture for animal grazing, but it all too easily 
extends with potentially catastrophic results to many contemporary 
environmental settings. The expansive reach of modern technol-
ogy has turned the once seemingly infinite into the finite. Popula-
tions of ocean fisheries can be irreversibly destroyed. 
Underground aquifers of drinking water supplies can be forever 
lost. And, of course, potentially destructive global climate change 
may occur from increased loadings of carbon to the atmosphere 
from anywhere in the globe. 
Modern technology also has its limits, as the nation was tragi-
cally reminded in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina this past 
year. Modern technology allowed for the development of a major 
metropolitan area where nature, standing alone, would have pre-
cluded any such possibility. New Orleans was largely below sea 
level and existed only by grace of a complex series of levees 
22 [d. at 1244. 
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designed to keep water from flowing along its natural course. 
Even when properly constructed, such levees are no match, how-
ever, for the enormous force of hurricanes like Katrina, especially 
when thousands of acres of surrounding wetlands, which might 
have otherwise provided some natural protection from flood 
waters, are filled to satisfy ever-rising demands for residential, 
commercial, and industrial development. The upshot: the devasta-
tion of a city, the loss of human life, and the destruction of an 
invaluable aquatic ecosystem by floodwaters laden with toxic 
contaminants.23 
Hardin's central insight regarding the implications of human 
nature for the natural environment extends much further, however, 
than to just the potential tragic destruction of resource commons. 
Each of the individual actors in Hardin's proffered tragedy cause 
ruin to all because of their inability to look beyond the here and 
now. They perceive well their own, present short-term needs. 
They are unable to apprehend and take into account the longer-
term implications for individual persons at other times or in other 
places. Even if presented by information detailing those broader 
spatial and temporal impacts, they would be unable on their own to 
temper their own immediate actions as necessary to avoid the 
resource common's tragic destruction. The risks facing New Orle-
ans have been well-known for decades. Yet, short-term needs 
always trumped government's willingness and ability to expend the 
massive resources necessary to guard against long-term, low-risk 
events, even if of potentially catastrophic consequences.z4 
More recent research into behavioral psychology and human 
cognitive biases offers contemporary confirmation of Hardin's 
basic thesis. Experimental research shows that humans strongly 
favor avoidance of immediate costs over less immediate, longer-
term, and distant risks. Dubbed by some a "myopia" bias, scien-
23 Felicity Barringer & Michael Janofsky, E.P.A. Struggles to Determine Extent of 
Hazards in Sludge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at A24; Dan Barry, A Black-Green Curtain 
of Disease and Destruction, Grime and Stench, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,2005, at A16; Sewell 
Chan & Andrew Revkin, Water Returned to Lake Pontchartrain Contains Toxic Material, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A18; Ian Urbina & Mathew Wald, Residents Worry About the 
Threat of Hazardous Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,2005, at A20. 
24 Peter Applebome, Christopher Drew, Jere Longman and Andrew C. Revkin, A Deli-
cate Balance is Undone in a Flash, and a Battered City Waits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 1, 
at 25; Adam Cohen, If the Big One Hits the Big Easy, the Good Times May Be Over For-
ever, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,2002, § 4, at 12 (editorial page); Christopher Drew & Andrew 
Revkin, Design Flaws Seen in New Orleans Flood Walls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at A4; 
Jon Nordheimer, Nothing's Easy for New Orleans Flood Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
2002, at Flo 
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tists argue that a strong basic desire to avoid immediate costs is 
present throughout nature and is deeply rooted in evolutionary 
biology.25 
Others similarly argue that human genetic evolution has system-
atically favored consumerism and materialism, i.e., the so-called 
"selfish gene. "26 When, over thousands of years ago, human beings 
relied on hunting and gathering to get their next meal, long-term 
planning was of little value. After all, without a means of preserv-
ing food, there was little reason to plan. It was better to consume 
what one found when one found it, especially when there was no 
assurance that more would be found tomorrow. "Our brains were 
built for a world in which the currency of the day did lose value 
over time. Put simply: food rotS."27 "[N]ature created within us a 
short-sighted set of moral instincts."28 
Selfish shortsightedness and materialism became dominant ten-
dencies in the competition with other species for survival. "Rather 
than leave some precious energy lying around to mold or be stolen, 
put it in your stomach and have your body convert the food into an 
energy savings account. "29 The drive for survival arguably 
extended to the production of heirs-survival by the passing of 
genes to one's children-and the accumulation of material wealth 
often seen as a necessary prerequisite for successful reproduction. 3D 
And, "even though wealth may not relate to babies in an industri-
alized world, our instincts come from a time when concerns over 
material possessions were crucial."31 One commentator has gone 
so far as to suggest, provocatively, that "[h]uman failings, such as 
those that some call the Seven Deadly Sins, may all derive from 
our evolutionary traps. "32 
But, whatever the origins of humanity's limited spatial and tem-
poral horizons, the laws of nature do not limit their potentially 
tragic consequences to classic resource commons or to guarding 
25 David A. Dana, A Behavorial Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 
Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324-26 (2003). 
26 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). 
27 TERRY BURNHAM & JAY PHELAN, MEAN GENES 30 (2001). 
28 P. Wesley Edwards, A Darwinian Approach to Metaethics, Freethought Debater, 
updated Aug. 21, 2004, http://www.freethoughtdebater.comIFEvolutionaryEthics.htm 
(lasted visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
29 BURNHAM & PHELAN, supra note 27, at 19. 
30 MICHAEL RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY 231 (1986). 
31 BURNHAM & PHELAN, supra note 27, at 120. 
32 Michael J. Chapman, Hominid Failings: An Evolutionary Basis for Sin in Individuals 
and Corporations, in EVOLUTION AND ETHICS: HUMAN MORALITY IN BIOLOGICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 101, 103 (Philip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss eds., 2004). 
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against catastrophic events such as hurricanes. The laws of nature 
constantly spread out ecological cause and effect in a spatial and 
temporal manner that poses analogous problems for humankind. 
Global and local wind patterns push the consequences of activities 
in one place to increasingly distant locations. The natural move-
ment of water does the same. But so too do the host of chemical 
cycles that link together through chemical processes seemingly dis-
parate aspects of the ecosystem. The hydrologic cycle (water) is 
simply the best known of many.33 There are a host of such chemi-
cal cycles: in addition to the carbon cycle related to questions about 
global climate change,34 there are nitrogen,35 sulfur36 and phos-
phorous cycles?7 The implication of each is that individual activi-
ties in one place have consequences in other places and at other 
times. 
The need for environmental law can be seen as arising from the 
persistent gap between the spatial and temporal horizons of human 
nature and the much wider and longer spatial and temporal dimen-
sions of the consequences of human activities because of the laws 
of nature. Within the narrower context of The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, Hardin referred to the need to "legislate temperance."38 He 
contended that freedom, ironically, necessitated "mutual coercion 
mutually agreed upon. "39 
That is, of course, modern environmental law's central mission. 
Environmental law seeks to regulate activities that occur in the 
here and now to temper their potentially tragic consequences for 
the there and then. Human nature will not do it on its own, which 
is why formal legal rules become necessary. To be sure, our will-
ingness to embrace such coercive laws may be viewed as expressing 
another competing, sometimes seemingly dormant, aspect of 
human nature: a potential willingness to cooperate for the longer-
term good of all. And, there are evolutionary biologists and econo-
mists who contend that human nature has the potential for 
extending beyond short-sighted self interest and to extend to coop-
33 See generally ELIZABETH K. BERNER & ROBERT A. BERNER, GLOBAL ENVIRON. 
MENT: WATER, AIR, AND GEOCHEMICAL CYCLES 2-23 (1996). 
34 Id. at 29-34; see also Peter M. Vitousek, Beyond Global Warming: Ecology and 
Global Change, 75 ECOLOGY 1861, 1862-65 (1994). 
35 BERNER & BERNER, supra note 33, at 142-46; Vitousek, supra note 34, at 1865-70. 
36 BERNER & BERNER, supra note 33, at 142-46. 
37 Id. 
38 Hardin, The Tragedy of Commons, supra note 21, at 1245-46. 
39 Id. at 1247. 
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eration and reciprocal altruism.40 Even so, environmental protec-
tion rules are inherently coercive to the extent that they seek to 
cause people to act in ways contrary to their more atomized, natu-
ral individual tendencies. 41 
Environmental law's challenge, therefore, is to realize Hardin's 
vision of "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon." This is hardly 
an attractive, aspirational objective. Nor is it easy to accomplish. 
It is not easy to pass laws that regulate human activities at one time 
and place for the benefit of human activities (let alone nonanthro-
pocentric and ecocentric values) at another time and place. It is 
especially difficult because the further that the laws of nature 
spread cause and effect out over time and space, the more scientific 
uncertainty there will be regarding whether the adverse environ-
mental effects projected in the future will in fact ever happen and 
whether the adverse environmental effects perceived today were in 
fact caused by specific activities in distant locations and times. 
It is not easy for any lawmaking system to agree upon laws that 
are mutually coercive under such circumstances. As discussed 
below, the United States is no exception.42 
III. THE NATURE OF THE NATION's LAWMAKING INSTITUTIONS 
Environmental law seeks to fill gaps created by the differing spa-
tial and temporal horizons of human nature and the laws of nature, 
but the challenge of environmental lawmaking is further increased 
by the nature of the nation's lawmaking institutions. Most simply 
stated, those lawmaking institutions make it systematically hard to 
enact laws that fill the necessary gaps. The various challenges are 
rooted in the structure of those institutions, constitutional limita-
tions on government lawmaking, and electoral politics. 
40 See generally Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOL-
OGY 35 (1971); ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MATTHEW 
RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 53-66 (1996). Professor Thomas Schelling, the most 
recent winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics is one of the leading economic 
game theorists on the role of cooperation in human behavior. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, 
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE (1984). 
41 Matthew Ridley & Bobbi S. Low, Can Selfishness Save the Environment?, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Sept. 1993, at 76. 
42 The challenge for lawmaking systems to make environmental law is discussed at 
greater length in my recent book, RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMEN. 
TAL LAW 29-42 (2004). 
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A. Structure of Lawmaking Institutions 
The defining characteristic of our nation's lawmaking institutions 
is fragmentation. By deliberate design, our lawmaking institutions 
are fragmented to avoid the concentration of lawmaking power 
and thereby reduce the risk of its abuse and corruption. Lawmak-
ing authority is fragmented horizontally between branches of gov-
ernment-executive, legislative, and judicial-with "checks and 
balances" designed to allow each branch some ability to guard 
against excesses in the others. 
The horizontal fragmentation, moreover, does not end at the 
border of each of the three branches. Within each branch, there is 
further fragmentation. For instance, while the President is the 
Chief Executive, executive branch lawmaking authority is, often as 
a matter of law and even more often as a practical matter, the 
responsibility of different cabinet agencies and departments. These 
agencies approach issues from very different policy perspectives 
related to their competing, and sometimes opposing, missions. 
The Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) are, for instance, both within the 
executive branch and both report to the President. But their views 
on environmental protection issues have tended to begin from dif-
ferent policy premises, use different analytic frameworks, and seek 
to further different substantive ends. OMB is naturally more con-
cerned with immediate, short-term economic costs and more will-
ing to discount costs in distant times and places, especially those 
not readily subject to monetization. 
Lawmaking authority is also fragmented vertically, with lawmak-
ing authority allocated between federal, state, tribal, and local gov-
ernmental authorities. Here too the design is deliberate and 
largely intended to avoid the potential abuses of undue concentra-
tion of lawmaking power in a centralized authority. The Constitu-
tion does not confer general lawmaking authority on the federal 
government, but instead limits the government to discrete catego-
ries of lawmaking power while reserving the remainder to the 
States, whose essential sovereignty the Constitution in turn seeks 
to safeguard. For instance, Congress has lawmaking authorities 
under Article I of the Constitution related to spending, managing 
property, raising revenues, and regulating commerce between 
Indian tribes, States, and foreign nations.43 But the Supreme Court 
has long held that Congress lacks general police power authority to 
43 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, d. 1, 3. 
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enact laws designed to promote the health, safety, and welfare of 
the American people.44 The Tenth Amendment expressly reserves 
general lawmaking authorities to the States,45 which the Supreme 
Court has interpreted to further limit federal governmental 
encroachment on essential attributes of state sovereignty, including 
a prohibition on federal commandeering of state lawmaking 
authority.46 
The historic reasons for such fragmentation are well known: to 
guard against a repeat of the kind of centralization of lawmaking 
authority by distant governments against which the nation rebelled 
in its founding.47 But no matter how meritorious the reasons, the 
implications for environmental lawmaking are no less substantial. 
All fragmentation makes it more difficult to enact comprehen-
sive laws and to make ongoing revisions to legal rules in light of 
new information. Moreover, because of the way that the laws of 
nature ensure that cause and effect in the ecosystem are spread out 
over time and space, fragmented lawmaking authorities are not 
likely to have the necessary jurisdiction over both the cause and 
effect. As a consequence, those concerned about the adverse 
effects may have no jurisdiction over the cause and those with 
jurisdiction over the cause may have no political accountability to 
those suffering the adverse effects. 
Downstream and downwind jurisdictions invariably approach 
environmental protection matters from a different perspective than 
upstream and upwind jurisdictions. Neither is well situated to 
determine the applicable environmental protection rules for the 
other. This is true when "down" and "up" refer to their relative 
spatial location, and the simple mechanics of an upstream source of· 
pollution cause adverse· consequences in downstream locations. 
This is no less true when, given the expansive scope of modern 
industrial technology, the "down" and "up" refer to relative tem-
poral dimensions and activities that can have devastating, irreversi-
ble effects realized only in the distant future. 
44 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (discussing limitations on 
federal police power, citing Nat'l Relations Labor Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995». 
45 U.S. CONST., amend. X. 
46 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992). 
47 See 1 RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 3.12 (West 1986). 
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B. Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Lawmaking 
The Constitution's concern with excessive governmental over-
reaching extends beyond its assignment of lawmaking authority 
between the three branches in the first three Articles and its gen-
eral reservation of authority to the States. The Bill of Rights is 
exclusively directed to limitations on the exercise of governmental 
authority: the federal government in the first instance and, by way 
of the Fourteenth Amendment selectively applied, to state govern-
ment as well. To the extent that each of these constitutional 
amendments makes lawmaking more difficult, they also make envi-
ronmental lawmaking more difficult. For instance, criminal 
enforcement of environmental protection laws must, like all crimi-
nal prosecution, work within the constitutional bounds established 
by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches 
and seizures48 and the Fifth Amendment's right against self-
incrimination.49 
But apart from this generic effect, there are several specific 
amendments within the Bill of Rights that raise heightened chal-
lenges for environmental lawmakers in particular. The Fifth 
Amendment's protections against deprivation of property without 
due process of law and its ban on takings of private property for 
public use without just compensation are two obvious examples.50 
Environmental protection laws, whether aimed at preventing spe-
cies extinction, water degradation, or air pollution, frequently 
restrict the exercise of property rights in natural resources because 
of the impact of that exercise at other times and places. 
Here too, the laws of nature do not confine the impacts of an 
owner's use of her property to the property itself or the owner's 
own lifetime. It is quite the opposite. Wind, water, and the many 
chemical cycles that make up the ecosystem ensure that there will 
be temporal and spatial spillover effects. Yet for that same reason, 
efforts to guard against those effects through environmental regu-
lations tend to generate claims of government deprivations of pri-
vate property or, in especially harsh circumstances, regulatory 
"takings" of property. It is no coincidence that the legal fountain-
head of the modern regulatory takings doctrine, Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, decided by the Supreme Court in 1922,51 arose in a 
48 u.s. Const., amend. IV. 
49 U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
so Id. 
S! 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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case where a property owner challenged the constitutionality of a 
restriction on coal mining under the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. This coal mining restric-
tion was a regulatory precursor to the kinds of restrictions found 
throughout environmental protection law today. 
Finally, there are distinct features of our political process that 
render environmental lawmaking problematic, again because of 
the ways that the laws of nature ensure a spreading out of cause 
and effect in the ecosystem. We elect our President to a four-year 
term and members of what are supposed to be our nation's most 
important lawmaking bodies (Congress and state legislatures) to 
serve relatively short terms (e.g., six, four, two years). The reason 
for the relatively short length is straightforward: to increase their 
accountability and therefore their possible responsiveness to the 
current voters in their relevant legislative district. 
But such short-term and more narrowly defined electoral 
responsiveness necessarily places environmental protection con-
cerns at a disadvantage. An elected representative is held account-
able for things happening right now and affecting constituents in a 
discrete place. In short, the "here" and "now" are the voters, 
which makes it hard for elected representatives to focus on the 
"there" and the "then." Not only are the voters necessarily limited 
to the here and now, so, too, tend to be those monied interests that 
fund political campaigns. To be sure, there are eleemosynary orga-
nizations that possess the longer-term and broader perspectives, 
but the resources available to those organizations tend to be far 
less than that which is available to those organizations concerned 
with more immediate needs. 
Environmental lawmaking within this constitutional framework 
and through these political processes is, accordingly, systematically 
disadvantaged. It constantly runs into obstacles, sometimes pitting 
one branch of government against another,52 sometimes prompting 
conflicts between different parts of the same branch,53 and just as 
often generating conflicts between competing sovereigns: between 
52 See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Congressional Republicans Take Aim at an Extensive 
List of Environmental Statutes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,2005, at A14; John H. Cushman, Jr., 
Senate Backs Cuts in Environmental Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,1995, at A35; John H. 
Cushman, Jr., The 104th Congress: The Environment; House Approves Sweeping Changes 
on Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at AI; Editorial, The G.O.P. 's War on Nature, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1995, at A20; Jerry Gray, In House, Spending Bills Open Way to Make 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1995, at A16. 
53 Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991). 
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the federal and state government;54 between state governments;55 
or between state, tribal, and local governments. 56 Indeed, the past 
several decades of environmental lawmaking are littered with such 
cases. Returning to scientific analogies for a moment, it is akin to 
the phenomenon known as "friction" in classic Newtonian mechan-
ics: physical movement cannot occur absent some friction. It 
requires contact, whether to a greater or lesser extent, between at 
least two competing surface areas.57 
The making of environmental law also depends on movement, 
albeit of a different kind. To get a law enacted through the legisla-
tive process requires a host of distinct steps: a proposed bill moves 
through the committee process, is considered by both chambers, is 
subject to further debate and amendment in conference committee 
and/or on the floor, and is finally sent to the President for signature 
or possible veto. The promulgation of a rule within a federal 
agency requires its own kind of movement: a rule is formally pro-
posed and published in the federal register, public hearings may be 
held, public comments are considered, the rule is revised, and the 
final rule is ultimately published. 
Relations between competing sovereigns present similar analo-
gies. Congressional passage of a federal statute or a federal 
agency's promulgation of a rule is typically one of the first of sev-
eral subsequent steps that must take place, most often by state and 
local government agencies and officials, before the relevant federal 
statutory provision or regulation has any actual legal effect. Each 
distinct step creates an opportunity for, analogous to Newtonian 
mechanics, friction, as the various parts of the nation's lawmaking 
apparatus grind out a law. The conflicts that surrounded the stat-
ute's initial enactment or a rule's promulgation follow it through 
each implementing stage. 
Modern environmental law's evolution in the United States dur-
ing the past several decades is, accordingly, dominated by the polit-
ical equivalent of heat in classical mechanics: conflict and 
controversy. Many of the resulting disputes, when formally 
expressed in lawsuits brought to the federal judiciary, arise out of 
conflicts between lawmaking authorities within and between com-
peting branches of government and sovereign authorities. As 
54 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Gade v. Nat'l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
55 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). 
56 See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996). 
57 1 SERWAY & JEWETT, supra note 16, at 139. 
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opposing interest groups enlist different branches to champion 
their concerns, the two branches clash. The same occurs when 
opposing interests enlist different sovereigns as their champions. 
While environmental concerns (primarily the distributional con-
sequences of environmental protection laws) underlie the disputes, 
the legal issues formally raised are rarely distinctly "environmen-
tal" in character. They instead concern jurisdictional disputes-
"separation of powers" between branches58 and "federalism" 
between sovereigns59-as the courts try to sort out which branch or 
sovereign'S position should prevail. Nor is there a consistent pat-
tern in terms of whether the resolution of those jurisdictional dis-
putes favors one set of environmental interests or another. There 
is just the converse. 
At various times in the nation's history, greater executive branch 
autonomy has favored stronger environmental protection laws, as 
the legislative branch sought to promote the interests of those 
favoring their relaxation.60 But at other times, environmentalists 
have favored more assertion of legislative control and a tightening 
of the reins on the executive branch.61 Similar themes are evident 
in the area of federalism, defining the lawmaking border between 
the federal and state government and between competing state 
governments. Sometimes environmentalists favor a stronger fed-
eral government, overriding state autonomy,62 and other times they 
trumpet the sovereign authority of states to impose more environ-
mentally protective requirements.63 While the precise source of 
the difference in viewpoint can often be explained by whether a 
state is downstream or downwind rather than upstream or upwind, 
the federalism issues are the same, making it impossible to find any 
consistently principled legal view of federalism being advocated by 
anyone in environmental disputes. 
Although the docket of the United States Supreme Court is 
infinitesimally small (only about eighty cases a year) relative to the 
huge number of cases heard by federal and state trial courts, the 
Court's docket illustrates the jurisdictional character of the envi-
58 See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
59 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001). 
60 See LAZARUS, supra note 42, at 131. 
61 [d. at 99-113. 
62 See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 
438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
63 See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 
(2004). 
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ronmental cases most likely to be before the High Court. For 
instance, during the political imbroglio surrounding Anne Gor-
such's tenure as EPA Administrator during the Reagan Adminis-
tration in the early 1980s, the issue reaching the Supreme Court in 
Morrison v. Olson concerned the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute authorizing the creation of an Independent Counsel to investi-
gate and potentially prosecute wrongdoing by high-ranking 
executive branch officials.64 In that instance, the Independent 
Counsel was investigating possible criminal violations associated 
with the executive branch's refusal to turn over certain agency doc-
uments that Congress sought in order to determine whether the 
EPA had committed malfeasance in its enforcement (or alleged 
lack thereof) of federal environmentallaws.65 
The vast majority of environmental law cases before the 
Supreme Court are similarly focused on jurisdictional disputes 
between competing lawmaking authorities. There have been a host 
of cases considering whether state laws designed to limit the dispo-
sal of waste within their borders are unconstitutional on the ground 
that they amount to undue burdens on interstate commerce outside 
the scope of state lawmaking authority under the federal Constitu-
tion.66 There have likewise been many cases concerned with the 
federal government's ability to oversee state implementation of 
environmental law, ranging from cases in which the federal govern-
ment seeks to enlist state aid in the implementation of federal 
law,67 cases in which states seek to impose more stringent require-
ments on commercial activities than those imposed by federal 
law,68 and cases in which the federal government seeks to oversee 
or override state implementation of federal environmental law.69 
Finally, there are many cases raising separation of powers issues: 
the legislative branch seeking to oversee the work of the judicial or 
executive branch;70 the legislative branch, conversely, seeking to 
64 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
65 [d. at 665-68. 
66 See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-
fill v. Mich. Dep't. of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of 
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
67 See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 
827, 838-42 (9th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 977 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
68 See, e.g., Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987); Pub. Util. 
Dist. No.1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
69 See, e.g., Alaska v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
70 See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
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delegate lawmaking authority to the executive branch;71 and the 
judicial branch seeking to ensure that the executive branch's imple-
mentation of a federal environmental statute is consistent with con-
gressional intent. 72 
Because, however, so many environmental legal controversies 
arise in a context in which the environmental character of the legal 
issue presented is not front and center, there is a related risk that 
the courts deciding these issues fail to apprehend that character 
and its possible relevance to the issue's resolution. Indeed, as dis-
cussed below, the Supreme Court itself has failed in that precise 
way. The Court seizes on the kinds of jurisdictional disputes that 
dominate much of environmental law without any appreciation for 
how and why the disputes are raised. And, as a result, the Court's 
rulings all too often fall short. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT 
As I have contended recently elsewhere at greater length,?3 my 
own view is that much of the Supreme Court's recent environmen-
tal law precedent reflects a lack of appreciation of the special chal-
lenges presented by environmental lawmaking. The Court's 
fundamental failure in this respect has prompted individual mem-
bers of the Court to make a series of mistakes both at the jurisdic-
tional stage and on the merits. In deciding whether to accept a 
case for plenary review, the Court has been too willing to grant 
petitions filed by parties who claim that environmental protection 
laws are overreaching, which has led to an unfortunate skewing of 
the Court's docket. Even to the extent that the Court's rulings on 
the merits are more balanced than the grants of jurisdiction, the 
Court has largely stood ready to correct lower court errors of only 
one kind: regulatory overreaching and not regulatory 
underreaching. 
The gravamen of the error lies in the Justices' overreaction to 
the legal issues generated by the process of environmentallawmak-
ing. The Court fails to recognize these lawmaking issues as a 
healthy byproduct of an important evolutionary process of envi-
71 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
72 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
73 This portion of the essay both borrows from and builds upon my recent book chapter, 
Richard J. Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law and the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 9 
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., Environmental Law Institute 2005). 
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ronmentallawmaking that requires accommodation and reconcilia-
tion of jurisdictional disputes within and between branches and 
competing sovereign authorities. Rather, the Justices perceive 
environmental law, especially the pressures it places on other inter-
secting areas of law, as a destabilizing threat that needs cabining. 
As a result, the Court has been more apt to retard from the outside 
rather than to engage constructively from within the necessary evo-
lutionary process being triggered by the demands for environmen-
tal lawmaking. 
Claims that environmental protection laws amount to unconsti-
tutional takings of private property, that environmental citizen-
plaintiffs lack the "concrete" injuries necessary for Article III 
standing, or that federal environmental agencies are trampling 
upon the sovereign prerogatives of the States, are all variants on a 
common and related theme. Each of these disputes arises from the 
way that the laws of nature make it difficult for our lawmaking 
institutions to fashion environmental law. Wholly missing from the 
Court's decisionmaking in such cases is any appreciation of the 
broader legal evolutionary context. 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Counci['4 is illustrative. That opinion invokes "background 
principles" of the common law of tort and property law as the ulti-
mate measures of the constitutionality of an environmental land 
use restriction that deprives a landowner of all economically viable 
use.75 The ruling thereby ignores the underlying reasons for why 
the law has needed to evolve away from those background princi-
ples in light of contemporary understanding of the need for 
stronger environmental protection law. 
The precise environmental restrictions at issue in Lucas barred 
new coastal development in too close physical proximity to the 
shore.76 The state law was enacted in response to a nationwide 
effort, triggered by federal coastal zone management policies, to 
promote more careful development of coastal properties because 
of their ecological fragility and their potential exposure to destruc-
tive storms.77 Indeed, the kind of catastrophic damage caused 
recently by Hurricane Katrina was one of the justifications cited by 
74 505 u.s. 1003 (1992). 
75 [d. at 1029. 
76 [d. at 1007-09. 
77 See Carol M. Rose, The Story o/Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between 
Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 258-61 (Richard 
J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). 
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the South Carolina Coastal Council in Lucas for the need to bar 
new residential development in especially exposed locations.78 
The Supreme Court in Lucas lacked, however, the perspective 
necessary to appreciate the justifications for a prospective change 
in the rights of property owners to build homes in certain places. 
The Court failed to see beyond the simple fact that the landowner 
wanted to do nothing more than build a home as the others before 
him had been allowed. The majority displayed no appreciation of 
the propriety of rethinking private property rights in light of the 
very real dangers created when fragile coastal zone ecosystems, 
intensive residential development, and ocean storms are combined. 
A recent dissent written by Justice Kennedy similarly reflects the 
absence of the necessary broader perspective. Ever since joining 
the Court in 1987, Justice Kennedy has been the most significant 
Justice in environmental cases, at least to the extent that he has 
been in the majority more often than any other Justice, often pro-
viding the decisive fifth vote.79 The Court's recent Clean Air Act 
decision in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. 
EPA,80 however, was one of those extremely rare circumstances 
when Kennedy found himself on the dissenting side.81 
In Alaska, Justice Kennedy wrote for four Justices dissenting 
from the majority's ruling that the EPA possessed the authority 
under the Clean Air Act to second guess a state agency determina-
tion of what amounts to "best available control technology"82 
applicable to a stationary source of pollution. While the precise 
legal issue was highly technical and narrowly applicable, Justice 
Kennedy's dissent struck much broader themes and relied on 
remarkably strident rhetoric. The dissent accused the majority of 
taking "a great step backward in Congress's design to grant States 
a significant stake in developing and enforcing national environ-
mental policy."83 The dissent further accused the Court of embrac-
78 Id. at 261-63; see Respondent's Brief at 28-35, Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992) (No. 91-453). 
79 See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in 
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 712-15 (2000); Richard J. Lazarus, Environ-
mental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653,656 
(2002). 
80 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
81 Id. at 502 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
82 42 U.S.c. § 7479(3) (2000). 
83 Alaska, 540 U.S. at 516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 251 2005-2006
2005] The Nature of Environmental Law 251 
ing an unwarranted "presumption that state agencies are not to be 
trusted to do their part. "84 
Justice Kennedy's mistake was that he perceived an inroad on 
federalism and a lack of trust of state sovereign authorities without 
stepping back to consider the possible reasons for that inroad or 
distrust. The Clean Air Act, like most federal environmental stat-
utes, is deliberately and pervasively riddled with distrust. Its provi-
sions do not fully trust state governments just like they do not fully 
trust industry or the federal government. 
There is, moreover, a reason for such congressional distrust. 
Congress understood the powerful political and economic pres-
sures that would be placed on agencies to compromise away envi-
ronmental protection objectives during the implementation of 
aspirational environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act that 
sought to address diffuse interests. The legislators responded by 
creating a multiplicity of checks and balances within the statutory 
scheme. They provided for the EPA to review and approve State 
implementation of the federal statute,85 and they authorized States 
to sue the EPA for failing to abide by the Clean Air Act's require-
ments,86 including the federal agency's regulation (or lack of regu-
lation) of upwind States.87 And, of course, Congress included 
powerful citizen-suit provisions in the Clean Air Act and virtually 
all of the other federal environmental laws even to allow for some 
citizen (and thereby judicial) oversight of the government's exer-
cise of its enforcement authority. In short, what Justice Kennedy 
perceived as a problem may have been better understood as a 
solution. 
Finally, the recently released papers of Justice Harry Blackmun 
offer additional insight into the narrow nature of the Court's think-
ing and the need for the Justices to develop a broader theoretical 
understanding of the nature of environmental lawmaking and the 
demands of legal evolution. 
When Justice Blackmun died in March 1999, his will provided 
that the Library of Congress could make public his papers five 
years after his death, which the Library did in March 2004. The 
papers are voluminous in their number and even more extraordi-
nary in terms of their revealing nature. They include more than 
1,500 meticulously organized boxes of files containing documents 
84 Id. at 507 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
85 42 U.S.c. § 7410 (2000). 
86 Id. § 7604(e). 
87 Id. § 7426. 
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related to Blackmun's entire life, including his 23 years on the 
Supreme Court from 1971 to 1994. The Library of Congress table 
of contents for the files is 362 pages in itself.88 
The documents related to his time on the Court tell a much fuller 
story about the Court's decisionmaking process in individual cases 
than ever before. While other Justices have previously released 
their papers, none provided as much detail so quickly. Justice 
Blackmun not only kept copies of all written memoranda prepared 
within his own chambers, but also copies of all memoranda 
received from other chambers and docket sheets recording all 
votes at all stages in every case. Even more remarkably, he took 
notes, purportedly verbatim, of what the Justices said at their Con-
ference deliberations on cases being decided on the merits. Those 
conferences are, by strict tradition, the most confidential of the 
Court's proceedings. Only the Justices themselves are in attend-
ance. Other Court personnel and law clerks to individual Justices 
are not permitted in the room.89 
The Blackmun papers reveal Justices often discussing their own 
views of the policy implications of an environmental ruling even 
when those policy preferences should arguably be irrelevant to 
their disposition of the legal issue before them. Many of those 
individual policy preferences appear to be a reflection of the Jus-
tices' own life experiences, both personal and professional. The 
papers therefore confirm the commonsense notion that a Justice's 
own life experiences affect their perception of a case, even if not 
always their ultimate vote. Justices' life experiences inevitably 
affect their appreciation of the impacts of alternative rulings in the 
real world. That, too, is human nature. And judges, even Supreme 
Court Justices, are human. 
88 Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Harry Blackmun - A Register of his 
Papers in the Library of Congress (2003) (prepared by Connie L. Cartledge with the assis-
tance of others). 
89 The Blackmun Papers reveal much about the Court's deliberative process, but no 
doubt the most revealing are Justice Blackmun's notes taken during the Conference on 
what each Justice said. He wrote his Conference notes in his own distinct shorthand, 
requiring some translation. Although Blackmun proffered these notes as verbatim quotes 
of what the other Justices said, they remain his notes of what they said, rather than an 
actual verbatim transcript by a disinterested professional reporter or a mechanical device. 
There is, accordingly, an unlJ;voidable risk that Blackmun consciously or unconsciously 
filtered the statements made by other members of the Court in a manner that distorts their 
meaning. A fuller description of the Blackmun Papers, and related issues, is contained in a 
forthcoming article, Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the 
Faltering of the Property Rights Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 Hastings L. J. 
(forthcoming Apr. 2006). 
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Justice Powell's vote in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City 
of New York90 is illustrative. In Penn Central, the Supreme Court 
in 1978 rejected a takings challenge to New York City's historic 
landmark designation of Grand Central Terminal. While on the 
Court, Justice Powell was generally a stalwart advocate of business 
interests and was concerned about the burdens that environmental 
regulation placed on private property rights in particular and 
American business in generaI.91 Yet, in Penn Central, Powell 
joined Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority rejecting a regu-
latory takings claim based on the extent to which the City's historic 
landmark designation prevented greater economic development of 
Grand Central Station.92 What the Blackmun Papers reveal is that 
at the Conference, Justice Powell acknowledged a personal bias 
favoring historic preservation laws based on his work in support of 
Colonial Williamsburg in his home state of Virginia.93 
To similar effect is Justice Byron White's vote in United States v. 
New Mexico. 94 Justice White was a westerner from Colorado, 
where water can be scarce and water law, for that reason, is both 
important and complex. At issue in United States v. New Mexico 
was whether the federal government's reservation of land for the 
establishment of a national forest included a reservation of those 
waters necessary to maintain the general forest ecosystem.95 The 
federal government, supported by environmentalists, claimed that 
the reservation extended to such expanded water rights, while the 
State of New Mexico resisted that federal claim, leaving more 
water available for allocation to private commercial interests. The 
Court, in an opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, sided with 
New Mexico that no such water rights were impliedly reserved on 
behalf of the federal government. Justice White, along with two 
other Justices, joined Justice Powell's dissent from that ruling, 
which described at length the environmental harm to the forest 
ecosystem that would result from a failure to provide adequate 
water to maintain the forest's ecosystem.96 
90 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
91 Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme 
Court, supra note 79, at 729-33. 
92 438 U.S. at 107. 
93 The B1ackmun Papers, Penn Central, No. 77-444, Conference Notes (Apr. 19, 1978) 
(Container No. 273). 
94 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
95 [d. at 697-98. 
96 [d. at 718. 
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According to the Blackmun Papers, however, Justice White orig-
inally voted at Conference with the majority to affirm the lower 
court's ruling in favor of New Mexico.97 White characterized the 
case as involving "little water law" and just a matter of "statutory 
construction."98 At the same time, he acknowledged that it "hurts 
to affirm a bit" because the "States are dependent on tourism [and] 
would cut their own throats if they let streams dry up. "99 
It is impossible to know for sure whether the latter policy con-
cerns are in fact what prompted Justice White subsequently to 
switch his vote from the Rehnquist majority to the Powell dissent. 
But White's letter to Justice Powell, formally joining the dissent, 
certainly leaves that impression, albeit in tongue-in-cheek fashion: 
"You have sold me on the birds and bees. Please join me in your 
partial dissent. "100 
Notably, however, most of the occasions when Justices expressed 
concern with the policy implications of a particular ruling were 
When their votes were inconsistent with those concerns. The Jus- . 
tices, therefore, did not permit their policy preferences to dictate 
their assessment of the legal issue before the Court. For instance, 
Justice O'Connor voiced strong concern with the policy implica-
tions of her initial vote at Conference in one of environmental 
law's most famous cases, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council. 101 The Chevron case involved the validity of EPA's deci-
sion to interpret the term "source" in the Clean Air Act in a way 
that provided air pollution sources more flexibility in meeting the 
Act's requirements. At Conference, O'Connor decried that 
"[i]ndustry is suffering" and admitted that it was "very painful for 
me. "102 She also described what the EPA was seeking to do as a 
policy that "made sense as a concept."l03 Yet, she nonetheless 
voted at Conference for NRDC, presumably because she under-
stood that her own policy preferences could not trump her assess-
97 The Blackmun Papers, United States v. New Mexico, No. 77-510, Conference Notes 
(Apr. 28, 1978) (Container No. 274). 
98 [d. ("Little water law here. Just sta constr.") 
99 [d. ("State depdt on toursim wI cut own throats fi try let streams dry up.") 
100 The Blackmun Papers, United States v. New Mexico, No. 77-510, Letter from Justice 
White to Justice Powell, Re: U.S. v. New Mexico, No. 77-510 (June 23, 1978) (Container 
No.274). 
101 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
102 The Blackmun Papers, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, No. 82-1005, 
Conference Notes (1984) (Container No. 397) (dated "3-25-84" but that must be incorrect 
because not argued until February 29, 1984). 
103 [d. 
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ment of the merits of the legal arguments. 104 (Because of the death 
of Justice O'Connor's father a few weeks later and a related con-
flict of interest that arose in the administration of his estate, she 
subsequently recused herself from the case. ).105 
The same law/policy juxtaposition is evident in the Blackmun 
papers relating to the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. Hill,I06 
often referred to as the "snail darter" case. At issue in TVA v. Hill 
was the validity of issuing an injunction to prevent the completion 
of a darn that everyone agreed would cause the extinction of a spe-
cies of snail darter. The Court upheld the injunction in a ruling 
often widely touted as a great victory for environmentalists in the 
Supreme Court.107 
The Blackmun Papers reveal, however, a Court persuaded that 
the relevant statutory language compelled the result, but strikingly 
hostile to the policy implications of upholding the injunction. The 
author of the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger, originally 
voted to summarily reverse in favor of lifting the injunction. !Os In a 
handwritten note to Justice Blackmun, the Chief Justice described 
the case in strictly policy-oriented terms: "Snail Darters vs. Elec. 
Power. "109 During the Conference deliberations on the cases, two 
of the Justices voting in favor of the injunction-Justices Marshall 
and Stevens-were nonetheless sharply critical of the statutory pol-
icy. Justice Marshall said that "Congress can be a jackass" and 
expressed the "hope" that "Congress will do something about 
it."llo Justice Stevens characterized the statute as "stupid" and the 
injunction as "ridiculous. "111 
Then-Justice Rehnquist similarly displayed an ability to divorce 
his views on the meaning of a particular statute from his views on 
whether that same law expressed sound policy. In Union Electric v. 
104 [d. 
105 The Blackmun Papers, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, No. 82-1005, 
Note to Conference from Justice O'Connor (June 14, 1984) (Container No. 397). 
106 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
107 See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New 
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, supra note 77, at 109. 
108 The B1ackmun Papers, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701, Docket Sheet, (Container No. 678); 
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Mar-
shall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10606, 10610-11 (Oct. 1993). 
109 The Blackmun Papers, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701, Handwritten Note from Chief Jus-
tice to Harry Blackmun (undated) (Container No. 268). 
110 The B1ackmun Papers, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701, Conference Notes (April 21,1978) 
(Container No. 268) ("Cong can be a jackass, if it must" "Hope Cong wI do something ca 
it"). 
111 [d. ("Ridiculous - hundreds v species + tie thgs up" "Stupid stat but - erodes + struc-
ture v our Gt "). 
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EPA,112 the issue before the Court was whether the EPA could 
reject a state plan to implement the Clean Air Act on the ground 
that the state plan imposed too great an economic burden on 
sources of air pollution in the state. The Court ruled that the EPA 
lacked authority under the federal statute to reject a state imple-
mentation plan on the ground that it was unduly harsh. Then-Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion. At Conference, he 
described the federal statutory scheme as "harsh and draco-
nian,"113 but concluded that the result was mandated because the 
statute was "not confused on this point. "114 
In all of the thousands of pages in the Blackmun Papers relating 
to environmental law cases, the Justice shown to be most influ-
enced in his legal reasoning by his own policy views was Justice 
Blackmun-perhaps for no other reason than that the Papers inev-
itably revealed the most about their own author. For instance, in 
Fri v. Sierra Club,115 the issue before the Court was whether the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 required the EPA to prevent significant 
deterioration in the air quality in those areas of the nation that 
otherwise met clean air standards necessary to protect public 
health and welfare. The federal court of appeals had ruled in favor 
of the Sierra Club's claim that the Act included such a mandate1l6 
and the Supreme Court ended up affirming, without opinion, by an 
equally divided four to four vote (Justice Powell was recused from 
the case). . 
The Blackmun Papers for the case include the Justice's notes to 
himself in preparation for the oral argument in the case. The notes 
list the various policy considerations supporting the Sierra Club's 
legal argument, which the notes describe as the Justice's "gut reac-
tion. "117 The policy considerations include: 
• "We have a problem" 
• "States would compete downwind'" 
• "Pollution is no respecter of state boundaries" 
• "This would force Industry" 
• "Need to preserve some decent areas" 
112 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
113 The Blackmun Papers, Union Electric v. EPA, No. 74-1452, Conference Notes (Janu-
ary 23, 1976) (Container No. 224) ("A harsh and draconian stat but n confused on this 
point."). 
114 [d. 
115 412 U.S. 541 (1973). 
116 4 BNA Env't Rep. Cases 1815 (1973) (per curiam). 
117 The Blackmun Papers, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No.72-804, Blackmun Handwrit-
ten Pre-Argument Notes (undated) (Container No.169). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 257 2005-2006
2005] The Nature of Environmental Law 
e "Only by national action can we have effective action" 
• "Doubt if the answer is to be found in balancing" 
257 
\9 "If affirmance is wrong, Congress can correct - resolve the 
doubts in that direction" 
• '''Promote and enhance' is general language but it is signifi-
cant and has clear meaning, despite its being in the 
preamble"118 
Blackmun's notes include his summary of the competing considera-
tions: "Policy for me is all one way. "119 He accordingly joined three 
other Justices (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) voting in favor of 
the Sierra Club, which allowed the environmental group to pre-
serve its victory by an equally divided Court. Justice Blackmun's 
reasoning, if accurately reflected in his notes in the case, would 
certainly seem to amount to the kind of judicial activism frequently 
condemned in contemporary times: a judge deciding the meaning 
of a federal statute based on his own consideration of the compet-
ing policy considerations rather than exclusively on indicia of con-
gressional intent. In the early 1970s, however, such judicial 
reasoning was, unlike today, far closer to the mainstream. 
Regardless of the propriety of a judge (or Justice) using his or 
her own policy preferences as a guidepost for resolving a legal issue 
before a court, the most striking thing about the Blackmun Papers 
is what is not present in the thousands of pages of documents. The 
Papers reveal tremendous detail about the internal deliberations 
within the Court on hundreds of environmental cases decided 
between 1971 and 1994: a time period covering the emergence and 
evolution of modern environmental law over the United States for 
more than two decades. Yet, wholly absent from both the public 
and now private documents is any significant awareness by any 
member of the Court of the distinctive nature of environmental 
law and the import for its emergence on other intersecting areas of 
law. 
More particularly, there is little to suggest that the Justices saw 
environmental law as a new, emerging area of law requiring their 
careful attention and stewardship. The environmental law cases 
were instead more often described as a highly technical, complex, 
and a tedious area of law to be shunted. This at least appears to 
have been the dominant view of Justice Blackmun who, ironically, 
118 Id. 
1191d. 
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was a Justice more favorably inclined than many others to the posi-
tions advanced by environmentalists. 
In the Union Electric v. EPA case, for example, Blackmun com-
mented in a note to himself that it would "not be a bad opinion to 
take on" but also added the damning caveat "if I have to have one 
in this general area."120 Blackmun's oral argument notes on sev-
eral Clean Water Act cases repeatedly made clear his lack of 
engagement. In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, Blackmun 
stated "I am sleepy,"121 a comment he repeated during the argu-
ment in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation ("I am getting 
sleepy");122 while in Chemical Manufacturers Assn v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, the Justice was more blunt: "What a 
dull case. "123 The federal Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act fared no better. He described the oral argument in City of 
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund (ED F) (in which I 
presented the oral argument for ED F) as "[a]ll very dull";124 in 
another RCRA case, City of Burlington v. Dague, the Justice's 
fatigue was apparently even greater still: "On & on. This has been 
a struggle today. I fight fatigue. "125 
Blackmun's clerks echoed the same theme. One opined that a 
National Environmental Policy Act case, in which the Court was 
ruling against the environmentalists, "is not one, it seems to me, to 
make a fuss about .... I don't think this is a case worthy of any 
separate writing. "126 On whether the Court should grant review in 
a Clean Water Act case pending before the Court on petition for a 
writ of certiorari, another Blackmun clerk disparagingly wrote: "I 
don't know what to advise you about these petitions. The clerks all 
call them 'those horrible EPA cases.' "127 
120 The Blackmun Papers, Union Electric v. EPA, No. 74-1542, Blackmun Pre-Argument 
Notes (Jan. 13, 1976) (Container No. 224). 
121 The Blackmun Papers, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233, Oral Argu-
ment Notes (Nov. 4, 1986) (Container No. 470). 
122 The Blackmun Papers, Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, No. 86-473, Oral 
Argument Notes (Oct. 5, 1987) (Container No. 490). 
123 The Blackmun Papers, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., No. 83-1013, Oral Argument Notes (Nov. 6, 1984) (Container No. 416). 
124 The Blackmun Papers, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, No. 92-1639, 
Oral Argument Notes (Jan. 19, 1994) (Container No. 639). 
125 The Blackmun Papers, City of Burlington v. Dague, No. 91-810, Oral Argument 
Notes (Apr. 21, 1992) (Container No. 602). 
126 The B1ackmun Papers, Robertson v. Methow Valley, No. 87-1703, Memorandum from 
"Ned" to Justice B1ackmun (Mar. 21, 1989) (Container No. 524). 
127 The Blackmun Papers, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, No. 90-1262, Preliminary Memoran-
dum to Justice B1ackmun from law clerk (Mar. 26, 1991) (Container No. 591) ("I don't 
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In sum, the development of environmental law during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century in the United States may, as I 
have argued elsewhere, represent one of the nation's greatest suc-
cess stories in law: a legal revolution that redefined the relationship 
between humankind and the natural environment and prevented, 
within our own borders, the kind of environmental devastation wit-
nessed elsewhere. The nation's highest Court, however, was 
largely a bystander, buried in case-by-case analysis that lacked any 
appreciation of the constructive significance of environmental law 
for domestic law in general and, accordingly, for the many related 
legal issues finding themselves before the Court. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The riddles posed at the outset of this essay share a common 
answer. The anomaly posited by Judge, now Chief Justice, Roberts 
concerning the now famous hapless toad is just a more recent 
instance of the kind of challenge facing environmental lawmaking 
in the United States. The precise problem is that congressional 
authority to enact such a law depends on the exercise of congres-
sional Commerce Clause authority. As mentioned above, Con-
gress does not possess general police power authority to enact laws 
designed to promote public health and welfare. Instead, consistent 
with the Framers' intention to fragment authority and limit the 
centralization of lawmaking authority, congressional lawmaking 
authority is expressly confined to several specific functions, one of 
which is regulation of interstate commerce. 
That is why the courts are now struggling to develop a coherent 
legal theory for why protection of endangered species can be fairly 
described as regulation of interstate commerce. The propriety of 
such regulation is clear, as is the necessity for the federal govern-
ment to playa leading role. The individual States alone cannot be 
relied upon to address the issue. The small numbers of species and 
their natural defiance of state borders require a sovereign authority 
possessing broader jurisdiction. Yet, those same small numbers 
and the simple fact that the public interest in species protection is 
not necessarily tied to their commercial value render the Com-
merce Clause's analytical framework awkward at best. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts in the Rancho Viejo case was simply acknowledging 
the extent of the resulting confusion in the lower courts and the 
know what to advise you about these petns. The clerks all call them 'those horrible EPA 
cases.' ") 
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concomitant propriety of further judicial inquiry into possible 
bases for upholding the Endangered Species Act's 
constitutionality. 
The second riddle, also described at the essay's outset, finds simi-
lar origin. Article III of the Federal Constitution provides for fed-
eral court jurisdiction only over "cases and controversies," which 
the Supreme Court has ruled requires that the party bringing the 
lawsuit establish a "concrete" and "imminent" injuryP8 The 
nature of cause and effect within the ecosystem-because of how 
cause and effect are so spatially and temporally spread out-makes 
it very hard, however, for environmental plaintiffs to establish that 
their injury is "concrete" or "imminent." 
The expansive temporal and spatial dimensions of ecological 
cause and effect defy traditional notions of concreteness and immi-
nence as defined by the Court's precedent. Environmental plain-
tiffs can harbor sincere, strong feelings about species that they may 
in fact never physically visit, but the injury they suffer from their 
extinction is no less intense or legitimate. Justice Scalia may, as he 
did writing the opinion for the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, mock such a connection as based on a "Linnaean leap."129 
But, for many Americans whose life experiences demonstrate such 
a connection with distant species, it is no leap at all. 
The real disconnect is instead between the Court's precedential 
touchstone for identifying the requisite injury for Article III stand-
ing and the kinds of causal connections sought to be vindicated by 
modern environmental protection law. It is incumbent upon the 
Court itself to bridge that gap and return to Article Ill's basic 
requirement of ensuring an adequately adversarial judicial pro-
ceeding, lest the Constitution be unfairly read as presenting an 
insurmountable obstacle to the enforcement of important federal 
environmental mandates. 
The final riddle introduced by the essay concerns the Clean 
Water Act's regulation of discharges into navigable waters, 
together with its lack of regulation of withdrawals of navigable 
waters. Both may have dramatic impacts on the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of those waters that the Act seeks to safe-
guard, yet only the former is subject to a per se prohibition absent 
a permit;130 the latter is left wholly unregulated by the federal stat-
128 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
129 [d. at 567 n.3. 
130 33 U.S.c. § 1311 (1995). 
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ute. Here again, the answer is found in the nature of the nation's 
lawmaking institutions, in particular the heavy emphasis the Con-
stitution importantly places upon maintaining the essential sover-
eign authority of the States. State governments historically have 
been preeminent on questions regarding water allocation author-
ity-no doubt because of their enormous distributional implica-
tions-and have jealously guarded against perceived federal 
governmental inroads. While the combined effect of a patchwork 
of federal laws like the Endangered Species Act,131 Federal Power 
Act,132 and Section 401 of the Clean Water Act133 have no doubt 
significantly eroded State monopoly over water allocation mat-
ters,134 the federal Clean Water Act's overall framework still 
largely reflects that once sharp division of authority. Traditional 
jurisdictional divides in lawmaking authority compete with the 
nation's ability to fashion a potentially more coherent and compre-
hensive environmental protection policy. 
Chief Justice Roberts represents the first Justice, let alone the 
first Chief Justice, of a generation of lawyers who literally came of 
age in the dawning of modern environmental law in the United 
States. They witnessed firsthand the emergence of environmental 
protection laws and their eventual settling into the legal landscape. 
Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
Roberts will prove able to develop a coherent jurisprudence of 
environmental law that reflects its nature, including its reflection of 
human nature and the laws of nature. The focus may at times seem 
exceedingly narrow-"the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons 
of its own, lives its entire life in California"135-but the stakes for 
the nation and the world are increasingly large. 
131 16 U.S.c. § 1538 (1988). 
132 16 U.S.c. § 821 (1920). 
133 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977). 
134 See, e.g., Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Adler, New Directions in Western 
Water Law: Conflict or Collaboration?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15 (2000). 
135 Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added). 
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